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Portraits of Wittgenstein and Hume are used as test cases in some preliminary investigations of a new kind of philosophical picture.  Such pictures are produced via a variety of visual transformations of the original portraits, with a final selection for display and discussion being based on the few results that seem to have some interesting relevance to the character or philosophical views of the philosopher in question.
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 Presumably a good philosophical picture--if there could be such a thing--would be one that embodied some philosophical idea or thesis in an unusual and specifically visual way.  Consequently, it should not be readily translatable without loss into standard philosophical language, because if that could be done, the picture would have no specifically visual philosophical value in its own right.

Recently I discovered what seems to be a new category of such images through a series of serendipitous accidents.  I was experimenting with some artistic software that can modify images in various ways, and happened to try them out on a few well-known portraits of philosophers.  What follows are two case studies of some images that resulted from my experiments on two philosopher portraits--of Wittgenstein and Hume--along with some descriptions of them, plus initial speculations as to what visual and cognitive factors might be involved.  

As an initial disclaimer, all of the following is very preliminary.  If there is any analogy at all to standard cases of completely unexpected discoveries, such as Alexander Fleming’s discovery of penicillin spores in a petri dish, then what is here is very much at an early observational stage, prior to any well-supported theorizing or testing.  But one has to start somewhere, and I hope that others will add their own reactions or examples to these studies to add to our understanding.

One brief note on terminology to be used here.  I distinguish an original picture, such as a standard portrait of a philosopher, from other pictures that could be derived from it by various visual transformations, calling the latter cases transformed pictures or TPs.  So almost all of the discussions to follow focus on the aesthetic and philosophical qualities of the derived TPs, rather than on those of the original portrait from which they are derived. 

Nevertheless, this is not to deny that some TP features might be inherited from, or be closely related to, features of the salient original portrait.  Also, sometimes it is helpful to focus on a feature in a TP by contrasting its TP presence with its absence from the original portrait.  And in general, it does seem to help in appreciating the special features of a TP if one keeps in mind the portrait from which it is derived.




































2. A Wittgenstein Portrait and Methodology






W Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1947

I shall be presenting and discussing twenty transformed versions of this portrait, divided into rough sub-groups.  But as a preliminary, here is some general information about the discussions.

First, the picture titles evoke various well-known issues or themes arising from Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings.  But since this essay is primarily about the pictures rather than the themes, scholarly references to those themes have been minimized.  If desired, a Google search on Wittgenstein’s name plus a picture title will rapidly turn up anything needed to grasp its philosophical significance. 

Second, it is generally agreed that one needs experience with many paintings by an artist in order to fully understand any one of them.  In the present case, a derivative point applies: in some cases, the title assigned to a transformed picture may depend to some extent on what seem to be the most appropriate titles to assign to the other TPs in the collection. Hence each has a relative place in the overall structure partially defined by the relative places of the others.






W1 Wittgenstein’s Two Phases

Could any two works of philosophy be more different than Wittgenstein’s early (1921) Tractatus on the one hand, and his later (posthumously in 1953) Philosophical Investigations on the other hand?  Nevertheless, as picture W1 shows, these indeed are but two phases in the work of the very same philosopher.  The original (1947) portrait W, from which W1 is derived, shows Wittgenstein in his Investigations phase, just four years before his death in 1951.  

The left side of W1 shows his earlier Tractatus work as receding and emptied out, while the right side emphasizes--in its laser-like intensity of gaze--his new appreciation of the enormous complexity of ordinary language, as thrown into high relief because of our previously almost complete lack of understanding of those complexities.  






W2 The World is the Totality of Facts








W3 The Totality of Wittgensteinian Facts











W4 An Aspect Dawns for Wittgenstein





led him to distinguish ordinary object-seeing from what he called ‘aspect-seeing’.  Then the ‘dawning of an aspect’ is a kind of aspect-seeing that happens when one suddenly interprets the same picture in a different way--such as by seeing it as a rabbit, when before one had only seen it as a duck.  






W5 Wittgenstein Seeing As













W7 More Aspects of Wittgenstein


















It is almost uncanny how the original portrait W, showing Wittgenstein as a self-assured intellectual giant, gives way so readily to an image such as W8--an immediate demonstration of his late obsessive puzzlement with anything and everything philosophical.  

Yet the visual transformation that produced W8 from W is a relatively minor one, involving no more than some minimal breaking-up of image areas plus some random noise additions.  It is almost as if Wittgenstein’s prominent incomprehension of everyday philosophical views lay just below the surface of his public face, so that only a minor adjustment in a visual scrutiny of him is needed to bring his obsession into clear focus. 





W9  Quizzical Wittgenstein






W10 Wittgenstein Imprisoned in the Fly-Bottle
















W11 Wittgenstein’s Loss of Problems

In various places Wittgenstein criticizes others for what he calls “loss of problems”, when they offer only superficial or one-dimensional solutions to complex philosophical issues.  However, Wittgenstein’s philosophical opponents might in turn criticize his later views, since they dismiss all philosophical problems as mere linguistic confusions that require no positive theoretical solutions at all.  W11 shows how Wittgenstein’s opponents might picture his later philosophy.


W12 Wittgenstein’s Private Thoughts
























7.  Life as a Weave



























W17 The Weave Takes Over




























W19 Wittgenstein’s Perpetual Crisis






W20 Wittgenstein in Command











9. A Portrait of Hume





H David Hume in 1766

I shall present sixteen transformed versions of this portrait that illustrate various aspects of Hume’s philosophical views and personality.  The transformation methods used are mainly different from those applied in the Wittgenstein cases, so as to achieve a greater overall variety in the results.  But this is appropriate in any case, since Hume and Wittgenstein have very different philosophical procedures, in spite of some similar conclusions (for example, both Hume and the early Wittgenstein share an atomistic metaphysics that denies the existence of any genuine connections between things).    











H2 Hume’s Fractured World











H4 Hume Thinking Deeply





















H6 Hume’s Instinctive Distrusts






H7  Hume in a Blue Funk


A ‘blue funk’ is a familiar state in which nothing seems to be right or go right for the person experiencing it.  I am not sure whether Hume himself was ever in such a state, but if so, picture H7 shows one way in which he might then have appeared.


H8 Hume in a Bad Mood
























H11 Hume in a Difficult Passage











H13 Hume Backing Off





H14 Hume’s Dark Hours






H15 Dawning of a Humean Idea






H16 The Revolutionary Hume














This essay has provided an initial investigation of some novel visual effects derived from portraits of philosophers.  But I hope that at least some of the images might also provide something for Hume or Wittgenstein enthusiasts that was never available previously—via a way of showing, rather than saying, something of significance about their subjects, to use Wittgenstein’s early Tractatus distinction. 

A main issue that remains unresolved for me is how far attempts—such as mine—to describe what is philosophically salient about each picture are genuinely descriptive of them.  For instead, at the other extreme, they might be no more than idiosyncratic personal reactions, caused more by the highly unusual nature of the images rather than by any of their intrinsic features.  Perhaps such issues might be clarified by cognitive studies in experimental aesthetics on images such as these.
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